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ABSTRACT 
 
BRYCE LOIDOLT: Terrorists or Troublemakers? Regime Survival  and Inflating  the 
al-Qaeda Threat. 
(Under the direction of Navin Bapat) 
 
 
 
 
Literature discussing counterterrorism, and, more broadly, military assistance, argues 
that this aid is unconditionally helpful to recipient states. Yet, in this paper I contend that 
military assistance puts recipients in a dilemma. Whereas literature has established  that 
donors are constrained in their ability to punish recipients who refuse to comply with their 
foreign policy objectives, I argue that recipients must strike a balance between complying 
with the donor’s policy objectives and insulating  themselves from domestic opposition. 
This paper focuses on how this dynamic is reflected in the recipient’s willingness to em- 
ploy public diplomacy to attract counterterrorism  assistance. I argue that while public 
diplomacy can signal compliance with international donor objectives, it can also signal to 
domestic audiences that the incumbent may be weak and not responsive to its constituents. 
Through a mixed-methods  research design that includes quantitative and qualitative  anal- 
yses of Arabic and English  language data from the Yemeni Arab Republic, I find some 
support for the argument that recipients  are limited in their willingness to attract mili- 
tary assistance through public diplomacy by the activity of domestic opposition groups. 
Greater attention to the recipients’ domestic level calculations and dilemmas may thus be 
warranted in the foreign aid literature. 
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1 TERRORISTS OR TROUBLEMAKERS? 
 
 
 
 
1.1   Introduction 
Military assistance has long been a crucial  instrument  of foreign policy. During the 
Cold War, the United States funnelled  military aid to anti-leftist regimes in order to strate- 
gically contain the Soviet Union. Since the Cold War, military aid has taken on a slightly 
different dynamic. Indeed, in the wake of 9/11, the United  States disbursed military aid to 
build the capacity of states willing to combat al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Rather than being 
contingent on a state’s ideological  leanings, then, this assistance was given to states that 
were willing to cooperate with the United States to fight local al-Qaeda cells but were too 
militarily weak to do so on their own.  The United  States is not the only country  to disburse 
counterterrorism aid. Australia, for example, provided millions  of dollars in counterterror- 
ism aid to the Indonesian government for similar purposes. 
Scholars examining the effects of military assistance largely  argue that it is uncondi- 
tionally beneficial to the recipient  state, and that it is not always a useful foreign  policy 
instrument for donors. Donors  use this assistance to gain policy concessions from the 
recipient (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Palmer and Morgan 2006). In turn, it strengthens re- 
cipient  states, allows them to resist democratization  pressure, and sometimes leads them to 
adopt more aggressive foreign and domestic policies (Levitsky  and Way 2004; Diamond 
2010; Bellin 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; Bapat 2011). This, of course, is 
of great benefit to incumbent regimes, but can also distort the utility of military assistance 
from the donor’s perspective. Donors are further hampered by the lack of ex ante instru- 
ments available to them to enforce compliance, as they will need to ensure that punishing 
a recipient  for non-compliance will not lead to state failure (White and Morrissey 1998). 
By viewing foreign aid through the lens of the donor, this scholarship  has not yet 
considered the dilemmas military aid can pose for recipients.  Recipients of foreign aid 
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must indeed strike a balance between complying with the donor’s foreign policy objectives 
and asserting their national sovereignty to maintain credibility  on the domestic front. This 
points to a broader gap in the literature on military aid, as it has yet to consider how the 
domestic politics of the recipient can drive both recipient and donor behavior. 
Because it ignores the domestic politics of the recipient, existing literature would ex- 
pect recipients of foreign aid to constantly be demanding aid and, once they receive it, 
signalling compliance with potential donor objectives.  A cursory glance at statements 
made by leaders of countries receiving  counterterrorism  assistance, however, indicates 
that they are inconsistent and even contradictory in their descriptions of terrorist violence. 
For example, Algerian President ’Abd al-’Aziz Boutefleka,a recipient of US counterterror- 
ism aid, argued in August 2010 that terrorism in his country had “diminished....due to the 
support and efforts of the Algerian [armed] forces.”1  Yet, nearly a month later the Pres- 
ident emphasized the danger that terrorist  groups posed to the international  community, 
paying particular attention to the need for using “modern methods” to combat it.2. Given 
that the level of terrorist activity in Algeria was unlikely to change drastically  within a 
month, what explains these contradictory  statements? That is, why was Boutefleka eager 
to highlight the threat of terrorism in September, but not in August? 
Drawing on a closer examination of the recipient’s domestic calculus, this paper seeks 
to explain why recipients at times use public diplomacy to pressure donors into provid- 
ing aid to fight terrorism, yet at other times restrain their demands and seek to create the 
perception of autonomy from their donor. I argue that public diplomacy -to include the 
employment of official media sources, speaking occasions, and other channels to influ- 
ence the international community  - serves as a signaling  mechanism  in two ways. First, 
it raises the costs of donor inaction  and sends a costly signal to the international com- 
munity. This renders public diplomacy  a particularly  useful foreign policy instrument 
the recipient  can use to attract counterterrorism aid. Yet, counterterrorism-related pub- 
lic diplomacy  also sends a signal to the recipient’s  domestic audiences. In particular, it 
 
 
1 “Boutefleka Yu’akid Taqalas al-Irhab fi Biladihi,” Hespress, 19 August 2010. 
 
2 “Butafliqa Yahadhir min Tawzif al-Irhab li-Khara’it Google Earth,” Echoroukonline, 28 September, 
2010. 
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can signal the incumbent’s  need for foreign  assistance, which  could indicate weakness or 
vulnerability. Furthermore,  because accepting foreign  aid involves accepting the donor’s 
policy objective, public diplomacy can further signal the recipient’s non-responsiveness 
to its constituents and/or the opposition.  By making the recipient appear to be a foreign 
“puppet,” counterterrorism-related public diplomacy  can also provide greater incentives 
for elites to challenge the regime from within by partnering with opposition groups. 
Because of these domestic signals, it is the activities of the recipient’s opposition that 
will shape its decision of whether or not to use counterterrorism-related public diplomacy. 
In order  to assess whether or not it can or should signal compliance with the donor’s policy 
objectives, the recipient will monitor the activity of opposition groups. When this activity 
is low, the recipient faces the very real possibility  that the donor could punish them for 
not complying with their counterterrorism objectives. That is, because the regime is well- 
entrenched, the donor could punish the government without  it leading to state failure. At 
the same time, the incumbent need not be concerned with the negative domestic repercus- 
sions of appearing weak or non-responsive to its constituents, because opposition groups 
do not pose a threat to the regime. Both of these factors will create conditions  under which 
the recipient will be more likely to employ counterterrorism-related public diplomacy to 
signal compliance with the donor’s demands and attract aid. 
When opposition activity is high, the recipient faces the possibility of being abandoned 
by its donor. That is, the regime is at the point where it is losing control over its territory, 
which  could cause donors to hedge their bets by engaging with and even supporting oppo- 
sition groups. At the same time, signalling  weakness to its domestic audiences would not 
deter the recipient, as in this case the regime is on the verge of losing power. This will pro- 
vide incentives for the regime to signal compliance with the foreign  donor’s demands as 
a last resort to maintain  power, as the incumbent  will be unconcerned about emboldening 
an already very active opposition movement. 
When there is a moderate level of opposition activity, incumbent regimes in recipient 
states will avoid publicly appealing for counterterrorism aid.  In this case punishment 
from the donor might significantly jeopardize the incumbent’s grip on power, and thus the 
incumbent has fewer incentives to signal compliance with the donor’s objectives.  Also, 
the incumbent will want to avoid encouraging domestic opposition groups and other elites 
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by signalling that it is losing its grip on power and/or is prioritizing  the donor’s objectives 
over the opposition’s  demands.  Under these conditions  the recipient will be less likely 
to employ counterterrorism-related  public diplomacy.  These hypotheses thus suggest that 
aid recipients can avoid or ignore pressure from  donor states under certain conditions, and 
sometimes might benefit from the activities of opposition groups trying to replace them. 
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I briefly review literature on military assistance, 
highlighting its effects on the behavior and survival of aid recipients. I then offer a theory 
to explain the conditions under which a recipient  government  would choose to attract 
counterterrorism  assistance through public diplomacy,  as well as testable hypotheses.   I 
test my theory through  a mixed-methods  research design, and conclude with a broader 
discussion of the implications this research has for work on foreign  aid as a whole. 
 
1.2   Military Aid and Its Effects 
Literature on military aid has traditionally focused on its determinants and effects, with 
a particular emphasis on the latter. This work argues that military aid is ineffective in terms 
of donor desires, but beneficial for recipient regimes. Donors use military aid to delegate 
a strategic task to the recipient or at the very least induce the recipient to cooperate with 
their objectives (Alesina  and Dollar 2000; Palmer and Morgan 2006). Yet, due to the 
constraints of domestic political institutions and/or moral hazard, recipients may not be 
willing to make policy concessions to their donors (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007; 
Bapat 2011). Further, donors lack effective  ex ante measures to punish recipients who do 
not comply with their demands (White and Morrissey 1998). 
With this in mind, military aid does not always have its intended effect. In some cases 
recipients may pursue more aggressive domestic or foreign policies due to the fact that 
they are insulated from the repercussions of doing so (Lake 1999). Other studies have 
argued that counterterrorism aid in particular  can lead recipients to intentionally allow 
terrorist groups to survive on their soil, as eliminating  them would jeopardize future aid 
flows (Bapat 2011). 
Although military aid will not always be effective in terms of donor objectives, schol- 
ars have overwhelmingly  argued that from the perspective of the recipient government, 
its effects are positive.  Particularly  durable authoritarian regimes have been recipients of 
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large amounts of military aid (Bellin 2004; Diamond 2010). The mechanisms for this are 
twofold. For one, military aid can strengthen the coercive capability  of recipient  states, 
allowing them to more effectively  repress domestic opposition  (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith 2007; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985). Furthermore, because military aid is typ- 
ically given to states that are of some strategic value to the donor, the recipient can resist 
international democratization pressure (Levitsky and Way 2004). The Mubarak govern- 
ment in Egypt, for example, was long able to resist democratization  pressure from the 
United States by arguing that democratizing would yield a government that would renege 
on the Camp David accords and be more hostile to US regional interests.  Simply put, 
military aid is argued to be a boon to the survival of recipients. 
Scholars have not yet considered that foreign aid also puts recipients in a dilemma. 
More particularly, foreign assistance places pressure on recipients to both make policy 
concessions to the donor while simultaneously saving face on the domestic front. Should 
it fail to do the former, it can sometimes be punished by donor states for non-compliance. 
If it fails to do the latter, it risks encouraging domestic opposition groups and providing 
incentives for elites to move against the incumbent. In the section that follows, I more fully 
explore this dilemma by focusing on why and when recipients will use public diplomacy 
to attract counterterrorism aid. 
 
1.3   The Domestic Costs of Public Diplomacy 
In this section I outline an informal theory to explain when a state would decide to ap- 
peal for counterterrorism assistance by publicly  discussing the threat of al-Qaeda and other 
transnational terrorist groups. I will first briefly discuss the techniques states can employ  to 
attract counterterrorism assistance, differentiating between private and public diplomacy.  I 
will conclude that public diplomacy is an attractive  and necessary instrument  for recipients 
to solicit counterterrorism assistance from donor states. I next turn to a discussion  of how 
domestic opposition can impact the incumbent regime’s willingness to attract counterter- 
rorism aid through this instrument. More specifically, I propose a curvilinear relationship 
between the activities of opposition  groups and the use of counterterrorism-related public 
diplomacy.  That is, when the regime perceives the opposition to be very active or dormant, 
it will be more likely to use public diplomacy  to attract additional assistance. 
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There are two ways through which a potential recipient might try to attract counterter- 
rorism assistance. In some cases, a recipient  can resort to behind the scenes negotiations 
and bargaining through private diplomatic  channels. In using this private option, the re- 
cipient would obviously avoid public scrutiny. At first glance this would appear to be the 
ideal approach for recipients of US counterterrorism assistance, who could avoid criticism 
altogether by keeping its relationship with the United  States a secret affair. Yet, from both 
the perspective of the donor and the recipient,  public diplomacy  can also play a crucial 
role in attracting military aid for two reasons. For one, public diplomacy  places additional 
pressure on donor states, who, seeking to avoid transnational terrorism at all costs, will 
err on the side of caution with respect to counterterrorism  assistance. At the same time, 
because they might consider the recipient’s use of public diplomacy to be a costly  signal, 
a donor would be more likely to consider recipients who do so to be sincere in their desire 
to combat terrorist groups. 
But, public diplomacy can also expose recipients to domestic criticism. It can indeed 
provide fodder to opposition groups who can claim that the incumbent regime is acting 
on behalf of foreign donors, rather than its constituents. Furthermore, trying to publicly 
attract counterterrorism aid can also make the recipient appear weak, because it carries the 
inherent message that the incumbent  regime is unable to unilaterally assert its authority. I 
explore these dynamics more in-depth below. 
In order to understand why a recipient would need to use public diplomacy  in the first 
place, and, what might determine its willingness to do so, first consider the donor nation, 
who is persistently concerned with the political costs associated with failing to prevent 
terrorist activity on its soil. From the donor’s perspective there are clear political bene- 
fits associated with being perceived by its electorate  as proactive  in combating terrorist 
groups (Berreby and Klor 2006; Campbell 2005). At the same time, the electoral costs 
associated with failing to “connect the dots” with respect to terrorist activity will lead the 
donor to take preventative, if not sometimes unnecessary, measures to protect itself (Kibris 
2011). If a potential recipient of counterterrorism aid were to publicly declare that it was 
facing a threatening terrorist group and the donor ignored this, the incumbent regime in 
the donor state could be exposed to significant criticism if a terrorist  attack were, in fact, 
to materialize. Political opposition within the donor state could reasonably question why 
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the incumbent ignored the very clear warning signs emanating from the recipient state, to 
include the recipient’s own public discourse. Using public diplomacy to attract countert- 
errorism aid can thus raise the costs of inaction for donors. 
Realizing  this is the case, the recipient  clearly  has an incentive  to use public  diplomacy 
to attract assistance from the donor. That is, the donor’s fear of ignoring the recipient and 
being attacked by a transnational terrorist group will trump these doubts. Should a transna- 
tional terrorist group strike from the recipient’s territory, the incumbent regime within the 
donor state would face a great deal of criticism  and possible replacement through elections. 
This will lead the donor state to disburse counterterrorism aid liberally so as to avoid the 
criticism that it ignored the alarming and very public communications from the recipient 
state. 
At the same time, donors may also be more willing to view recipients who use public 
diplomacy to attract counterterrorism aid as sincere in their desire to combat transnational 
terrorist groups. We can consider the use of public diplomacy to constitute a costly signal, 
as it renders the recipient subject to increased international scrutiny and potential punish- 
ment (Fearon 1997). With respect to counterterrorism aid, these punishments  can take 
many forms. For one, if a recipient  successfully  used public diplomacy to attract coun- 
terterrorism aid and then reneged on its promise to cooperate with the donor to combat 
terrorist groups, it would certainly jeopardize future aid flows from the donor and the 
broader international community. For recipients who are heavily-reliant  on this assistance 
to maintain their ruling coalition, this could be devastating.  More extreme measures are 
also possible, to include economic sanctions, as well as being listed  as a state sponsor of 
terrorism. In making itself more vulnerable to these costs, a recipient  who uses public 
diplomacy will thus appear to be more sincere in the eyes of the donor. 
If we only considered the relationship  between the donor and recipient, which is the 
focus of existing literature, we would expect the latter to constantly use counterterrorism- 
related public diplomacy to signal compliance with the donor. In turn, donor states trying 
to avoid a terrorist  attack would assist the recipient’s  military by disbursing counterter- 
rorism assistance.  This would allow the incumbent regime to more effectively  repress 
domestic opposition groups, resist international  democratization pressure, and ultimately 
prolong its survival. 
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Unfortunately for recipients, using public diplomacy in this manner is also costly when 
we consider domestic pressures it may face.  For one, it leaves the recipient government 
vulnerable to domestic audiences, which can challenge the ruling government and even- 
tually pose a threat to regime survival (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998; Weeks 2008). In the 
context of counterterrorism aid, this typically revolves around the correct notion that the 
donor is providing counterterrorism assistance in pursuit of its foreign policy. In accept- 
ing this assistance, the recipient  is thus accepting an imported policy objective that may 
not align with the interests or priorities of its constituents or elites. As a result, domestic 
opposition groups can exploit the influence of foreign  states on the incumbent  regime as 
evidence that the regime is shirking its duties to its constituents. 
A number of instances demonstrate opposition movements using the incumbent regime’s 
relationship with the donor to pose a challenge to the regime. In the post 9/11 context, the 
bulk of this criticism  has been directed towards recipients’ security cooperation with the 
United  States. Consider the case of Pakistan. Having received billions of dollars in US 
assistance, the government  of Ali Zardari has faced considerable criticism from opposi- 
tion groups who have harnessed domestic nationalist sentiment to challenge the incumbent 
regime. Most prominent has been cricket-star-turned  politician Imran Khan, who claimed 
Zardari and his Prime Minister were “puppets of the United  States ready to do anything 
at the dictation of their masters.”3  In another case, the Aquino regime in the Philippines, 
also a recipient  of millions in US counterterrorism  aid, has faced similar  responses from 
opposition groups regarding its status as a recipient  of US assistance.  In one case, for 
instance, the author referred to the relationship  as a “puppet-master  relationship,” going 
on to call the incumbent  regime a “US stooge.”4  Further, in response to US military aid 
to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), an editorial in Hezbollah’s journal argued that the 
US was attempting  to shape and ultimately weaken the LAF to assert its regional interests, 
thus questioning the ruling 14 February coalition’s responsiveness to Lebanese citizens.5 
 
 
3 “Zardari,  Nawaz Puppets of the US: Imran Khan,” Pakistan Today, 21 October 2011 
 
4 Marya Salamat, “Nothing to Celebrate, No Real Friendship in Master-Puppet Relations, Critics Say,” 
Butalit, 4 July 2012. 
 
5 Musab Qashmar, “Tahqiq: al-Jaysh al-Lubnani wa Silah al-Amriki, Khubara’ ’Askariyun: Amrika La 
9 
 
 
 
In each of these cases, the incumbent’s  compliance  with foreign  objectives was used by 
domestic opposition groups to question the regime’s dedication to the national interest, 
and thus, its constituents. 
Signalling  a need for counterterrorism  assistance also demonstrates to domestic op- 
position groups that the incumbent regime may be losing control. Because it carries the 
inherent message that the government  is in need of foreign  assistance, domestic opposition 
groups will become emboldened  when a regime signals a need for counterterrorism aid. 
Unable to unilaterally  act against its opponents, the incumbent regime appears weak and 
incapable.  As such, domestic groups and elites seeking to replace the incumbent would 
become more assertive in their demands and activities. 
When deciding whether or not to attract it through public diplomacy an incumbent 
regime will be constrained by the activities of the opposition within its territory. For sim- 
plicity sake, I assume that the government  is agnostic regarding the source of opposition 
activity, thus allowing  us to speak of the opposition  as a unitary  actor. That is, I assume 
that the government does not differentiate between groups based on their ideological goals, 
but rather is more concerned with the tactics opposition groups employ, the magnitude of 
their activities, and the broader demands they make on the incumbent government. 
When there is a low level of opposition activity, the regime need not be concerned 
about the negative domestic consequences of signaling  a need for counterterrorism aid. 
The regime calculates that encouraging dormant opposition groups by calling for foreign 
assistance would not undermine its survival. Yet, well-entrenched regimes in this case will 
be concerned with donor punishment for non-compliance.  Donors could indeed punish 
well-entrenched governments to induce compliance without it leading to state failure. In 
this case, the recipient will thus need to signal compliance to avoid donor sanctions, and 
will do so without concern for domestic opposition groups.  This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
 
Tabi’ al-Jaysh al-Lubnani  Siwa al-Kilam” (Investigation:  The Lebanese Army and American  Weapons, 
Military Experts: America Doesn’t Sell the Lebanese Army [Anything] Other than Words), al-Intiqad,  15 
February 2010; Author Unknown, “Hizb Allah:’ li-Tatahammal  al-Hukuma wa Quwwa 14 Shubat Mas’uliya 
Makhatir al-Mashru’ al-Amriki” (Hezbollah:  The Government and Powers of 14 February Bear Responsi- 
bility [for] the Dangers of the American Project), Now Lebanon, 19 October 2007. 
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H1: When opposition activity is LOW, the incumbent government will be more likely to 
use public diplomacy  to attract counterterrorism aid. 
We should expect a similar result in cases where the opposition  is extremely active. 
In this case the incumbent  fears being abandoned by international donors.  Indeed, high 
levels of opposition activity could allow donors to consider alternatives to the incumbent. 
Because the incumbent is on the verge of losing power the benefits of receiving counterter- 
rorism aid outweigh the fodder publicly attracting it may provide for already emboldened 
domestic opposition groups, yielding: 
H2: When opposition activity is HIGH, the incumbent government will be more likely to 
use public diplomacy  to attract counterterrorism aid. 
It is when there is a moderate  level of opposition activity that the regime will avoid 
using public diplomacy in this regard. We would instead expect to see the government 
attempt to unilaterally divide, contain, or otherwise weaken the opposition.  Signalling  a 
need for counterterrorism aid would embolden the opposition and allow them to more ef- 
fectively challenge the government. Further, donors will be less likely to punish recipients 
for non-compliance, for fear of destabilizing them. This creates conditions  under which 
a recipient  will be less likely to use public diplomacy to attract counterterrorism aid, and 
thus: 
H3: When opposition activity is MODERATE, the incumbent government will be less 
likely to use public diplomacy  to attract counterterrorism aid. 
I test these hypotheses in the section that follows. 
 
1.4 Research Design, Data, and Tests 
In order to adequately capture the strategic calculus of the recipient state, I must take 
a number  of factors into consideration in my research design. For one, the activities  of 
domestic opposition  groups can vary a great deal within a year, and thus aggregating this 
as an annual score would  not be a satisfactory operationalization of this variable. Further- 
more, because my theory highlights the domestic calculations of recipient  states, I must 
hold the availability of counterterrorism assistance constant.  That is, my theory assumes 
that a potential donor is always available to provide counterterrorism assistance to the re- 
cipient, and that this donor is persistently concerned about the threat of terrorist groups 
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more generally. 
To test my theory, I assembled  a data set on the Yemeni Arab Republic, capturing 
weekly data during the post 9/11 period to be used in a mixed methods research design. 
In this section I will first outline why Yemen constitutes an ideal case to test my theory, 
before turning to a description  of my quantitative data. I will then use this data set to con- 
duct a statistical test of my hypotheses, assessing whether or not the relationship between 
opposition activity and the use of counterterrorism-related public diplomacy is curvilin- 
ear. Finally, I will turn to a qualitative  analysis by discussing the political context of Ali 
Abdullah Saleh’s Yemen before considering specific time periods of Saleh’s tenure as my 
qualitative  cases.  This will provide an in-depth examination of my theory and offer a 
deeper exploration  of the contextual factors involved in the performance of my variables. 
 
1.4.1 Yemen as a Test Case 
The political practices,  needs, and dilemmas of the Saleh  government,   as well as 
Yemen’s broader role in al-Qaeda-inspired  violence  render Yemen a suitable case to test 
my theory. First, focusing on the post 9/11 period allows me to comfortably assume the 
existence of a donor (in this case the United  States) willing to provide military aid to gov- 
ernments fighting  terrorist groups. This donor is merely waiting for the recipient to signal 
that it has a terrorist  problem, and that it is willing to fight them. 
We can hold the availability of this assistance constant given Yemen’s centrality in 
transnational terrorism. The country was touted by Usama bin Ladin in a document  recov- 
ered in his Abottabad  compound  as a “reserve force for the Mujahidin” and a “powerful 
tool for restoring the caliphate.”6  The country  has indeed served as a staging ground for 
al-Qaeda attacks on US targets, to include the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, as 
well as an attempt  to ignite explosives aboard a US airliner in December 2008. As such, 
Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian  Peninsula was described by former CIA director 
General David  Petraeus as al-Qaeda’s “most  dangerous” franchise.7   This led to a “strong 
 
 
6 United States West Point Combating Terrorism  Center Harmony  Project, document number:  SOCOM 
2012 0000019. 
 
7 Author Unknown, ’Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula ’Most Dangerous’,’ Daily Telegraph, 13 Septem- 
ber 2011. 
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partnership”  between the United States and Yemen with respect to combating al-Qaeda, 
particularly after 9/11.8 
A combination of the Saleh government’s  unique method of quasi-authoritarianism 
and dwindling resources would  also create a demand within the government for external 
support. In order to maintain political survival, the Saleh government distributed patron- 
age through tribal and kinship networks, adopting a blend of democratic and authoritarian 
practices and procedures. This included the cooptation and repression of domestic oppo- 
sition groups through modern and informal  institutions and patronage networks (Phillips 
2008). Yet, the Saleh government’s ability to continue its patrimonial  practices was jeop- 
ardized  as its resource base began to dry (Boucek and Ottaway 2010). The 9/11 attacks 
thus constituted an opportunity  for the Saleh government to extract resources from donor 
states hoping to combat al-Qaeda. 
Despite this opportunity,  President Saleh’s tenuous grip on power would render him 
uniquely sensitive to shifts in the activities of domestic opposition groups. This included 
the umbrella political party, the Joint Meeting Parties,  the Huthi rebels in Northwest 
Yemen, as well as the Southern secession movement.  Furthermore,  Yemeni  public  opin- 
ion was particularly unfavorable towards the United States and its policies.9   These factors 
should theoretically  constrain Saleh’s willingness  to attract counterterrorism  assistance 
through public diplomacy,  despite his importance  as a US counterterrorism partner and 
desperate need for resources. 
Thus, in the wake of 9/11 the US would come to view Yemen as a country  of great 
interest due to its role in global terrorism. As such, the availability of counterterrorism 
assistance to Yemen in the post 9/11 period can be held constant. This allows me to hone in 
on the domestic calculations of the Yemeni recipient in deciding when to publicly request 
and attract this assistance.   The Saleh regime’s patrimonial  political technology would 
create a demand  for external sources of revenue.  Yet, the regime should be constrained 
in its ability to attract this assistance by domestic opposition and anti-US sentiment. The 
 
 
8 The White House Office of the Press Secretary, ’Readout  of the President’s Call with Yemeni President 
Hadi,’ 13 September 2012. 
 
9 2011 Yemeni Stability  Survey, Gelvum Stability  Assessment, March 2011. 
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ruling government would thus need to monitor the activities of the domestic opposition 
when deciding whether or not to attract counterterrorism assistance from the US through 
public diplomacy. 
 
1.4.2  Data, Variables, and Statistical Tests 
To test the hypotheses I present in this paper, I collected and assembled data that consist 
of two elements, which will measure the use of public diplomacy to attract counterterror- 
ism aid, or CT Public Diplomacy, as well as Opposition Activity. To measure the former, I 
collected 587 issues of the Yemeni military’s weekly Arabic newspaper 26 September. In 
total, these newspapers contained nearly 60,000 Arabic  language articles. To operational- 
ize Opposition Activity I collected Newswire reporting of event data from Lexisnexis.  I 
consider the processes and assumptions inherent in these data below. 
To measure CT Public Diplomacy, I downloaded all available  issues of the Yemeni 
military’s newspaper from the online archives. This encompassed nearly 600 issues that 
spanned from July 2002 to February 2012. I truncated these data to include only regular 
issues, in contrast to those deemed “special issues” (I‘dad  Khasa), which are issued during 
national holidays in May and September. Table 1 below provides an annual count of the 
number of regular, weekly  issues of the newspaper that I employ in my statistical analysis. 
 
 
 
Year Regular Issues 
2002 24 
2003 47 
2004 53 
2005 51 
2006 50 
2007 50 
2008 50 
2009 52 
2010 52 
2011 39 
2012 7 
 
 
Table 1.1: Annual Counts of Regular Issues for 26 September, July 2002-February  2012 
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One could reasonably object that the Yemeni military’s newspaper would not accu- 
rately reflect the sentiment of the Saleh government.  That is, the Yemeni military might 
use this newspaper to communicate to a domestic audience, thus making it an inadequate 
data source to test my theory. More particularly, one might claim that the military would 
discuss the threat of al-Qaeda to influence the civilian government to increase its budget 
or gain other concessions. Yet, if the military were trying to influence government policy 
through this magazine, we would expect it to avoid using the post-9/11 lexicon of terror- 
ism, extremism, and al-Qaeda, which would have little domestic play within the Yemeni 
milieu. Furthermore, the newspaper’s editor in chief, Major General Ali Hassan al-Shatir, 
was a staunch supporter of President Saleh, allowing  us to consider the periodical to be a 
mouthpiece for the regime.10 
Furthermore, I do not contend that this newspaper is the only source that could be used 
to gauge official discourse from the Saleh government.  The availability and subject mat- 
ter of 26 September, however, warrants its use for quantitative analysis in this paper. We 
should reasonably expect the military -an institution most likely to benefit from countert- 
errorism aid- to be the news source in which terrorism would be discussed, and one of the 
channels through which the regime would use public diplomacy  to attract assistance. 
Due to the volume of this material, to facilitate quantitative analysis I employed an 
automated text analysis tool to count various descriptors of terrorist activity in each of 
the Arabic  language articles. This included the use of terms such as “sabotage”  (takhrib), 
“criminal” (ijrami), or “rebellion” (tamarrud) to refer to violent and non-violent  opposi- 
tion activity. As we will see, I do not consider these terms to fall within the parameters of 
CT Public Diplomacy as they would  not invoke  the same alarm from  western governments 
as other  terms. These latter terms include “terrorism” (irhab), “extremism” (tataruf) or 
al-Qaeda (al-Qa’ida).  These terms had indeed become mainstays in the political discourse 
of the United States and its counterterrorism partners after 9/11.11 That is, referring to or 
 
 
10 Sasha Gordon,  ”The Parallel Revolution in Yemen,” American Enterprise Institute Critical Threats 
Project, 6 March 2012. 
 
11 Emblematic of this is the fact that despite Yemen’s history that is rife with Islamist militancy and terrorist 
activity, “terrorism,” “extremism,” and “al-Qaeda” were very rarely mentioned in President Saleh’s regularly 
scheduled  speeches prior to 9/11. In fact, before 9/11 the President had not once referred to al-Qaeda in 
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discussing al-Qa’idist terrorism will invoke greater alarm from Western governments after 
9/11 than describing opposition  groups as criminals  (Mujrimin) or sabateurs (Mukhara- 
bin). To measure my key dependent variable, CT Public Diplomacy,  I thus rely on a sum 
of weekly counts of mentions of terrorism, extremism, and al-Qa’ida.  That is, I contend 
that the use of this post 9/11 discourse constitutes an attempt by the incumbent regime to 
use public diplomacy  in order to attract counterterrorism assistance and appear compliant 
to US CT demands.  To provide further detail as to how these search terms varied over 
time, Figure 1 depicts the annual total, average, and per issue term counts for a number of 
Arabic phrases. Figure 2, which  depicts a line plot and loess curve of these data, further 
highlights  the great amount of variation of my CT Public Diplomacy variable over each 
weekly issue. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Arabic Search Terms 
 
 
 
a speech, whereas terms  such as “extremism”  and “terrorism” were somewhat regularly  used to describe 
Israeli policy. See, for example: “Khattab Fakhamat al-Ra’is fi Munasibat Shahr Ramadan” (The Honorary 
President’s Speech on the Occasion of Ramadan), 26 November, 2000. 
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Figure 1.2: Loess Curve and Lineplot of CT Public Diplomacy 
 
 
 
To further illustrate how closely this newspaper aligns with Saleh’s own discourse, I 
will, however, analyze Saleh’s official speeches and media statements when I turn to my 
qualitative analysis.12 I retrieved these archived transcripts from the former  President’s on- 
line archive, located at www.presidentsaleh.gov.ye. For the post 9/11 period, this includes 
more than 600 transcripts.  These data were in turn examined according to specific time 
periods of Saleh’s rule, outlined in the qualitative section of this paper. 
To measure my key independent variable, Opposition Activity, I collected and hand 
coded peaceful and violent contentious  event data from Newswire reporting available 
through the Lexis Nexis archives. Before delving into the theoretical considerations be- 
hind how I coded this material to operationalize my key independent variable, Opposition 
Activity, I will first examine  a few potential objections regarding the data generating pro- 
cess associated with event data more broadly. 
The first objection  one can make with respect to using international news event cov- 
erage is its scope (Azar, Cohen, Jukam and McCormick  1972). That is, to what extent 
 
 
12 The smaller amount of this material precludes me from analyzing them quantitatively. 
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does this coverage represent the actual universe of events? Reporting may indeed heavily 
focus on the capital city, or over-report violent events (Strawn 2008). In employing event 
data that focuses on the Yemeni Republic, I am under no impression that my data set is a 
complete population of events that took place in the country, or that reporting  biases do not 
exist in international media coverage. However, because my interest in collecting this data 
relates to trends over time and I exclusively  used Newswire reporting on a single country, 
I can reasonably assume that media bias is constant, and that my event data are a represen- 
tation of the broader population (Koopmans 1999). If this is the case, the tendency of these 
sources to over-report on certain  areas or types of events would remain stable, allowing 
me to evaluate shifts in opposition activity as demonstrative  of actual changes, rather than 
a change in media source or bias (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). 
The second potential concern relates not to the bias of the international  media source 
covering the event, but the media environment in the country under examination.  This 
problem is particularly ubiquitous within authoritarian contexts in which the ruling party’s 
tight grip over the media will limit media coverage of opposition-related  events. If this 
were the case, international  media coverage would  be repressed, and its reporting would 
not be representative of the actual level of opposition activity in the country (David G. Or- 
tiz and Diaz 2005). My use of data related to Yemen, however, eliminates this concern. 
Indeed, the Yemeni  Republic  has been characterized as having a relatively  free press in 
which the President and ruling party were quite often directly challenged (Wedeen 2008; 
Carapico 1998). As such, the Yemeni government did not have the amount of control over 
the media that might exist in other authoritarian contexts. 
I now turn to my collection and coding of this material. As mentioned previously, I 
conducted  a search of Newswire reporting available in the LexisNexis  archives on infor- 
mation related to protests, strikes, demonstrations, and political violence.13  Although my 
independent variable Opposition Activity seeks to measure the observable activities of op- 
position groups, it is theoretically problematic to treat all opposition activity equally in a 
coding scheme. That is, existing literature on regime repression has clearly demonstrated 
that governments are more likely to repress events they deem to be more threatening to 
 
 
13 For a complete list of search terms, Newswire  sources, and codes used, see Appendix A. 
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their survival (Davenport 1995; Gartner and Regan 1996). Indeed, the demands made by 
the opposition during the event, the magnitude of participation in the event, the use of vio- 
lence, and other factors have all been shown to lead to increases in government repression 
(Davenport 1995; Gartner and Regan 1996). If this is the case, these empirical  findings 
must inform how I measure and operationalize Opposition  Activity. 
In building  this dataset, I employed a coding scheme that draws heavily on this litera- 
ture and ongoing data collection efforts on political unrest (Salehyan and Hendrix 2011). 
Each opposition activity event, defined as a violent  or non-violent act by a group or indi- 
vidual to challenge or otherwise voice discontent with a government individual  or policy, 
was thus coded to capture the tactics participants  used in pursuit of these demands, the 
magnitude of the event, as well as the nature of the demands that were made during the 
event. To capture the tactics the groups employed, I originally coded events to capture dif- 
ferences between strikes, demonstrations, riots, and organized violence.  Yet, there would 
be far too many assumptions built into a decision to code one of these types of activities  as 
more threatening to the government than others. With this in mind, I collapsed each event 
tactic  as (0) Primarily peaceful (1) Disorganized violence, rioting, or escalated peaceful 
demonstrations (2) Organized violence against the state. By giving violent  events a larger 
score then their non-violent counterpart, I thus operate under empirical  observation that, 
holding all else equal, a pre-planned violent event where the group employing violence is 
organized is indicative of greater opposition activity  (Davenport 1995; Gartner and Regan 
1996). That is, the planning and execution of organized violence requires a more vibrant 
and active opposition than a disorganized riot. 
The next two aspects of relevance are magnitude  and demands.  Magnitude  seeks to 
capture the number of individuals involved in the event. This was coded as (1) if the event 
involved  less than 10 individuals, (2) if it involved between 10-100 individuals,  (3) if it in- 
volved between 100-1000 individuals,  and so on. In building this indicator, I thus operate 
under the assumption that, holding all else equal, events involving more individuals indi- 
cates a higher  level of opposition activity. Finally, although my original coding scheme 
captured  a range of different  demands opposition groups could make during an event, I 
chose to recode these as follows: (0) If the event was largely related to foreign affairs and 
did not carry an implicit or explicit criticism of Yemeni government policy (1) if demands 
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made during the event called for political or economic reform, or (2) for cases where the 
event involved calls for secession or regime change. Whereas reformist  demands would 
seek to work within the existing system to gain political or economic concessions, revolu- 
tionary  demands would seek to overthrow the system entirely. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Scatterplot and Loess Curve of Opposition Activity 
 
 
 
I thus summed each of these indicators  for every event to produce a weekly measure of 
Opposition Activity,  a plot of which is outlined for each dimension in Figure 3.14 Although 
each of these indicators  is important, combining them into a single  index is inherently 
problematic.  For instance, it is difficult to argue that a non-violent  protest with reformist 
demands and 250 people present, which  would  produce a combined  index of “4”, is equally 
demonstrative of an “active” opposition than an event in which five individuals carried out 
an attack on a ruling party headquarters to protest economic inequalities.  The scores for 
each indicator  (Tactic, Magnitude,  and Demand) are thus generated as separate variables. 
To test the proposed curvilinear  relationship between Opposition Activity and CT Pub- 
lic Diplomacy, I estimate a series of negative binomial models. I consider each dimension 
of opposition activity - tactic, demand, and magnitude- in isolation from one another, es- 
timating  separate negative binomial models for each. I then turn to a model that includes 
all three of these dimensions of Opposition Activity in the same model. 
 
 
14 In compiling  these data, we at times had to make judgement calls with respect to ongoing conflicts, 
which at times would appear intermittently in reporting, with references to the fact that it was “ongoing.” 
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Table 2 below summarizes the results of each model, which assesses the relationship 
between the level of opposition activity and counterterrorism-related  public diplomacy. 
Viewing the regression results on their own, all three hypotheses appear to be supported. 
For each dimension of opposition activity, we see a positive, statistically significant coef- 
ficient  on my squared term, as well as a negative, statistically significant coefficient for the 
non-squared term, lending support to the hypothesis that there is a curvilinear relationship 
between the two key variables. I also estimate a model that includes each dimension  of 
Opposition Activity, the results of which highlight the robustness of the relationship be- 
tween the tactics involved in this activity and the Yemeni government’s willingness to use 
public diplomacy to attract counterterrorism aid. 
 
Model 1     Model 2    Model 3    Model 4 
(Intercept)                                           3.65∗             3.67∗        3.70∗         3.69∗  
                                                            (3.55, 3.75)    (3.55, 3.78)  (3.58, 3.81) (3.58, 3.80) 
Opposition Activity, Tactics(Log)           −1.06∗  . .   −1.07∗  
                                                 (−1.59, −0.53) . .  (−1.98, −.18) 
Opposition Activity, Tactics(Log)2                1.48∗  . .    1.70∗  
                                                             (1.00, 1.96) . .  (0.87, 2.52) 
Opposition Activity, Demand(Log) .          −0.53∗  .    0.86 
.    (−1.01, −0.05) . (−0.71, 2.38) 
Opposition Activity, Demand(Log)2 .            0.92∗       −0.53 
.      (0.53, 1.33) .  (−1.56, 0.53) 
Opposition Activity, Magnitude(Log) . .      −0.73∗         −0.74 
. .(−1.18, −0.29)(−1.74, 0.30) 
Opposition Activity, Magnitude(Log)2 . .       0.80∗           0.22 
. .(0.49, 1.12)    (−0.40, 0.83) 
N                                                             472  472        472            472 
AIC                                                                                                                                  4459.87 4479.93  4493.78      4462.18 
BIC  4526.39  4546.45  4560.29      4595.20        
log L  −2213.94 −2223.97   −2230.8      −2199.09 
Confidence Intervals in parentheses 
∗  indicates significance at p < 0.05 
 
Table 1.2: Quantitative Results 
 
 
 
Yet, when we view the fitted values produced by my model against my key independent 
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variable, the results lend less support to hypotheses 1 and 3. Below  we see a scatter plot 
of predicted values of CT Public Diplomacy produced by each model for different values 
of Opposition Activity. My fitted values appear to take on a curvilinear  shape, as the fitted 
values of CT Public Diplomacy gradually increase with a higher rise in each dimension 
of Violent Opposition Activity. Yet, at the low end of Opposition Activity there is only a 
slight increase in my dependent variable, indicating  that the relationship between the two 
may be linear. When we view these fitted values in the context of Figure 5, which plots 
unfitted values of CT Public Diplomacy against Violent Opposition Activity, we see that 
CT Public Diplomacy varies greatly at the lowest level of my independent variable. This 
casts further doubt on hypothesis 1, as the statistically  significant  results could be driven 
by a small number of outliers. 
My quantitative  results have lent limited support to the theory that shifts in violent 
opposition activity have a curvilinear  relationship  with the amount of counterterrorism- 
related public diplomacy. Yet, this paper and my hypotheses relate more directly to at- 
tempts by the recipient to use public diplomacy in order to attract counterterrorism  as- 
sistance. One could argue that merely counting mentions of terms such as terrorism,  al- 
Qaeda, and extremism, omits the context within which  these terms were used. 
With this in mind, I next turn to a more in-depth exploration of the Saleh regime’s post 
9/11 calculations,  and how these calculations  manifested themselves during three time 
periods that have low, medium,  and high measurements of Violent Opposition Activity. 
In the section that follows, we will see how variations in this variable lead to shifts in 
Yemen government willingness to attract counterterrorism aid through public diplomacy, 
with greater attention to the nature, rather than mere count, of the regime’s  use of terms 
such as al-Qaeda, terrorism,  and extremism. 
 
1.5   Patrimonial  Politics and Post 9/11 Yemen 
Before delving into specific time periods of President Saleh’s post 9/11 tenure, one 
must first grasp the socio-political context within which he operated.  In this section I 
do so by providing  a brief political history of the Yemeni Republic, with a focus on the 
dilemmas that are inherent in maintaining regime survival in such a fractured  and divided 
polity.  I conclude this section with a brief discussion of the implications  these factors 
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Figure 1.4: Fitted Values of Models 1-4 
 
 
 
would have for President Saleh in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
As he assumed the role of the President of the Yemeni Arab Republic in 1978, very 
few would expect the 36 year old artillery officer ’Ali ’Abdullah Saleh to survive the year. 
Part of this relates to the fate of his predecessors.  ’Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, who ruled 
North Yemen from 1967-1974 was ousted in a “corrective” coup by Ibrahim al-Hamdi, 
who, along with his successor Ahmad  al-Ghashmi,  were assassinated soon after taking 
power. When Saleh took control of the fledgling Republic then, the average tenure of 
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Figure 1.5: Opposition and Public Diplomacy (unfitted) 
 
 
 
Yemeni Presidents was no more than a few years. Also, Yemen was at the time plagued by 
periodic armed uprisings. Indeed, the Northern Republic faced intermittent violence from 
forces loyal to the communist-led People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in the South, 
as well as tribal rebellions resisting the influence of the central state within its borders. 
Beyond these conflicts,  President Saleh had to govern amidst Yemen’s many divides 
(Salmoni, Loidolt and Wells 2009). Within Yemen’s Muslim community, this would in- 
clude Zaydi Shias, Ismailis,  as well as salafis. Furthermore, regional divides would come 
to dominate Yemeni political allegiances, particularly in the wake of unification in 1990. 
That is, the North-South divide, which was emblematic of a broader fissure regarding the 
characteristics and policies of governing institutions, would  be a crucial fault line during 
Saleh’s tenure. Beyond this, the divide between Yemen’s urban elite and tribal periphery 
was also particularly salient, as the identity and allegiances of Yemenis varied accordingly. 
Seeking to secure his position  amidst such a tumultuous  backdrop,  President Saleh 
quickly began “coup-proofing”  his regime. This included incorporating influential family 
members and tribal shaykhs into key military and security posts, having the dual effect 
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of ensuring the loyalty of the armed forces and including potentially recalcitrant tribal 
elites in the state bureaucracy. Saleh’s cooptative practices were not limited  to the security 
sector.  Indeed, as Saleh developed the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC), he was 
able to offer ministries, governorships and other political offices to potential challengers 
(Alley 2010). In addition to security and political posts, Saleh would also come to use 
state-controlled  wealth  and, eventually,  private  sector access to buy the loyalty of tribal 
shaykhs (Alley 2010). Yet, the political technology of the Saleh regime was not a purely 
cooptative arrangement. That is, actors would at times find themselves co-opted and, soon 
thereafter,  coerced and repressed as the Saleh regime  sought to avoid over-empowering 
social actors through this system (Phillips 2008; Alley 2010). 
This need to maintain the flow of resources through patronage networks led the Saleh 
government to rely on a range of income sources. Key among these was foreign  aid from 
Gulf States, which, by 1986 had comprised 90 percent of Yemen’s state budget (Chaudrhy 
1997). As the price of oil dropped, however, the Yemeni  government moved towards a 
more comprehensive taxation policy, and, striking oil in 1984, it was able to draw on some 
indigenous funding sources. 
It is the newly-united  Yemeni  Republic’s  response to the first Gulf War (Operation 
Desert Storm) that severely strained its relationship with foreign actors on whom it had 
come to rely for economic assistance. Seeking to remain neutral, the Yemeni government 
abstained from UN Resolutions 660 and 661, which called for the immediate and uncon- 
ditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. As a result of its neutral position, the Yemeni 
government found its foreign aid drastically reduced. The Gulf states eliminated their for- 
eign aid package for the country, which at the time amounted to 300 million USD, while 
the US decreased its aid from 42 to 2 million USD (Colburn 2002). At the same time, 
hundreds of millions of unskilled Yemeni laborers were expelled from the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia, placing an enormous strain on the Yemeni state. 
As the Saleh government muddled through another civil war in 1994, faced widespread 
fuel riots in 1996, and reached the 21st century,  then, there was a strong need for this 
patrimonial regime to build its domestic capacity. The 9/11 terror attacks provided this 
opportunity  to the Saleh regime. Although  long under US pressure to do so, a combination 
of the presence of more pressing threats to the already weak regime, the need to not appear 
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overly subservient to US interests, as well as salafi influence within ruling circles solidified 
Yemen’s lukewarm desire to pursue Islamic terrorists prior to 9/11 (Salmoni, Loidolt and 
Wells 2009). Yet, after 9/11 the need for vigilance against Islamic terrorism would become 
far more pronounced,  as a number of the hijackers had Yemeni backgrounds, and Yemen 
had been the site of previous al-Qaeda attacks on US targets and personnel. 
It is amidst this environment of endemic political divides, historical memory of the 
disastrous results of proclaimed neutrality during the Gulf War, and the resulting need for 
authoritarian assertion that Saleh would view a post 9/11 US alliance as both a necessity 
and opportunity.  In November 2001, President Saleh met with President George W. Bush 
at the White House to discuss security cooperation with the United States and pledge 
his support for the US-led Global War on Terror. A month later during a speech  that 
marked the end of the holy month of Ramadan, President Saleh declared, “Brothers  and 
sisters....the Yemeni  Republic  has suffered much from terrorism...[it  has had] negative 
effects on the economy, investment, and tourism in our country.”15  Most demonstrative of 
the Saleh regime’s new outlook in the speech was the clear declaration that Yemen was an 
“important partner in supporting international efforts to combat terrorism.” 16 
Although this new alliance with the United  States certainly  carried political and ma- 
terial dividends, the latter of which are depicted in Table 3, President Saleh would at the 
same time be constrained in his ability to draw attention to this alliance by using the post- 
9/11 counterterrorism lexicon in official state media. These constraints would manifest 
themselves in opposition movements who might view the Saleh regime’s emphasizing al- 
Qaeda and its international cooperation in fighting the group  as a sign of weakness or 
non-responsiveness to their demands. Chief among these would be the Huthi movement, 
which, although  based in Northwest Yemen, drew the attention of international media 
when its supporters began chanting “Death to America, Death to Israeli, Curse Upon the 
Jews, Victory for Islam” in the grand mosque in Sana’a. At the same time, a diverse 
 
 
15 “Khattab Fakhamat al-Ra’is bi-Munasaba ’Aid al-Fitr al-Sa’id”  (His Excellency President’s Address on 
the Occasion of Eid al-Fitr),  15 December 2001. 
 
16 “Khattab Fakhamat al-Ra’is bi-Munasaba ’Aid al-Fitr al-Sa’id”  (His Excellency President’s Address on 
the Occasion of Eid al-Fitr),  15 December 2001. 
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Year CT Aid ($US Millions) 
2002 $.75 
2003 $.75 
2004 $0.00 
2005 $1.92 
2006 $4.51 
2007 $27.74 
2008 $.37 
2009 $66.91 
2010 $144.76 
2011 $1.83 
2012 $109.00 
 
 
Table 1.3: Annual US Counterterrorism Aid Disbursements to Yemen, 2001-2012 
 
 
movement in Southern Yemen that called for everything from political inclusion to seces- 
sion would also prove to be a particularly  contentious political movement,  as would the 
umbrella political organization known as the Joint Meeting  Parties (JMP). Other forms of 
disorganized and intermittent - but no less contentious- popular mobilization against Saleh 
policies would similarly drive the Saleh government’s willingness to employ these terms. 
At the same time, US officials seemed to struggle with whether Yemen was going to be 
a “partner  or target” in the US-led Global War on Terror, rendering punishment from the 
US donor to be a very real possibility at times (Hull 2011, 55). The threat of punish- 
ment came to its pinnacle in 2011, wherein the United States significantly decreased its 
counterterrorism aid to the Yemeni military amidst the popular uprisings against the Saleh 
regime. 
 
1.5.1  Time Period Selection Criteria 
Here I explore how activities of these opposition  groups shaped the regime’s willing- 
ness to resort to public diplomacy to attract counterterrorism aid. I will do so by conduct- 
ing within case analysis, selecting time periods from Saleh’s tenure to test and illustrate my 
theory. In selecting time periods I draw on Leiberman’s  nested research design, wherein 
qualitative cases are selected based on their proximity to predicted values produced by the 
quantitative model (Leiberman 2005). Figure 6 illustrates the relationship  between my 
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selected time periods and the results of Model 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: CT Public Diplomacy(Fitted)  and Opposition Tactics (Log), Case Time Peri- 
ods 
 
 
 
I further  select cases based on their variation on my key independent variable, Opposi- 
tion Activity, Tactics, the values for which are depicted in Figure 7 for each time period. I 
thus consider the following time periods in the section that follows: 1) October- November 
2002, during which the Saleh government would view the opposition  as relatively  weak, 
and used public diplomacy  to signal its sincerity in fighting al-Qaeda; 2) April-July 2005, 
a period during  which the Saleh government  would view the opposition  as moderate in 
strength, and thus avoid drawing  attention to the threat of terrorism or its relationship 
with the US; and 3) June-September 2011, wherein the Saleh government faced continued 
protests, general strikes, and intra-government  violence, leading them to relentlessly and 
very publicly  emphasize the threat of al-Qaeda and their need for international assistance. 
 
1.5.2  Post-9/11 Confidence (August-November 2002) 
Between August and November of 2002, President Saleh was able to enjoy the bene- 
fits of his role as a partner  in the War on Terrorism. Although in this section I focus on 
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Figure 1.7: Loess Curves of CT Public Diplomacy, Opposition Tactics, Case Time Periods 
 
 
 
the Yemeni government’s discourse during this period, the President’s actions further re- 
flected autocratic entrenchment. On August 6 2002, President Saleh issued a Presidential 
decree to establish the Yemeni National Security Bureau (Jihaz li-l-Aman al-Qawmi li-l- 
Jumhuriya al-Yamaniya),  a domestic intelligence  agency tied directly to President Saleh 
and in part established due to pressure from the United States, for whom the alleged jihadi 
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and Islamist ”penetration” of the existing domestic agency, the Political  Security Organi- 
zation, would be problematic.17    More than an institution  that could act more decisively 
against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the NSB could similarly be coopted by President Saleh 
to monitor  and repress all political opponents. At the same time, the President attempted 
to more authoritarively assert his control  over the Yemeni periphery and security appara- 
tus, breaking ground on a Political  Security building in the remote Sa’ada province, and 
reshuffling  a number of key military posts.18. 
The once-embattled President also faced very little observable opposition activity, and 
the US had approved nearly 21 million USD in military assistance, to include Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales (FMS),  and International  Military Edu- 
cation Training (IMET) (Salmoni, Loidolt and Wells 2009). President Saleh further hosted 
US security officials, to include then-USCENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks.19  Al- 
though earlier in the year the President had endured protests decrying US-Yemeni security 
cooperation, the opposition  movements appeared unable to harness this mobilization,  as 
they were left on the political sidelines. 
Perhaps because of this comfortable position vis a vis his domestic opposition, Saleh 
also faced  a very serious threat of punishment from his US donors. Former  ambas- 
sador to Yemen Edmund James Hull described the immense “growing pains” of the US- 
Yemen security relationship during this period, further discussing “semiserious” plans to 
invade Yemen (Hull 2011, 27,53). During this period the administration did at times carry 
out some minor punishments, to include delaying the disbursement of equipment for the 
 
 
17 For an in-depth discussion of the founding of the Yemeni National  Security Bureau, see: ”Jihaz al- 
Aman al-Qawmi: Bayn Ijtiyahat al-Dakhil wa Mutatalabat al-Kharij, Ajhiza Muta’adada wa Iqtisad Ya’ani 
al-Rukud!!” (The National Security Bureau: Between Internal Needs and External Demands, Multiple Agen- 
cies while the Economy Suffers a Recession!!!),  the al-Jazeera Center for Studies and Research, Undated 
Text.; For a discussion  of Islamist penetration of the Yemeni Political Security  Organization,  see: Hus- 
sein al-Lisswas, ”Mukhatir al-Sira’ bayn al-Aman al-Qawmi wa-l-Aman  al-Siyasi” (Dangers of the Conflict 
between National Security and Political Security), al-Ishtiraki.net, 12 January, 2009. 
 
18 ”Yawmiyat al-Ra’is ’Ali  ’Abdallah Saleh,” (President Ali  Abdullah Saleh’s Tenure), al-Markaz  al- 
Ma’lumat bi-Da’irat al-Tawjih al-Ma’nawi  li-l-Quwwat al-Maslaha, 2009, pp. 924-926 
 
19 ”Yawmiyat al-Ra’is ’Ali  ’Abdallah Saleh,” (President Ali  Abdullah Saleh’s Tenure), al-Markaz  al- 
Ma’lumat bi-Da’irat al-Tawjih al-Ma’nawi  li-l-Quwwat al-Maslaha, 2009, pp. 931. 
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Yemeni military (Hull 2011, 54). 
The low level of domestic opposition activity and very real threat of punishment from 
its US donor rendered the Saleh regime willing to signal compliance with US counterter- 
rorism priorities. Although some articles decried the use of terrorism as a pretext  for a US- 
led invasion of Iraq,20 writings in the military newspaper during this period overwhelm- 
ingly highlighted  US-Yemeni  security cooperation and portrayed terrorism  as a pressing 
threat to the Republic of Yemen. In one article, for example, the author described terror- 
ism as “among  the most dangerous threats facing humanity in the third Millennium.”21  In 
a later issue in October, another writer similarly  penned, “what bin Ladin and his al-Qaeda 
practice in the way of terrorism harms Arab interests more than anything, in addition to 
threatening Arab civilization...” 22 In other cases it was Yemeni officials  themselves, rather 
than the newspaper’s writers,  that sought to appear dedicated to combating al-Qaeda by 
highlighting  Yemen-US security ties. In one case, the head of the Yemeni Political Se- 
curity Office, a domestic intelligence agency, openly declared “there is open cooperation 
between us and there is coordination in the area of combating terrorism.”23 
Despite a relatively  low amount of opposition activity during this period, the Yemeni 
military’s magazine discussed at great lengths the threat of al-Qaeda and transnational ter- 
rorism, while simultaneously emphasizing its security cooperation with the United States. 
Terrorism  was portrayed as a global  threat to civilization. At the same time, Yemeni of- 
ficials did not hesitate to highlight Yemen’s cooperation in the US-led War on Terrorism, 
despite the potential for opposition backlash. Both of these discursive trends constitute 
attempts to demonstrate the sincerity with which the Yemeni Republic took the threat of 
transnational terrorism, as well as their willingness to work with the United States to defeat 
 
 
20 See,  for example:  Khayr Allah Kahyrallah, “’Alim  Yataghayur - 11 Sabtambir wa al-Masalah al- 
’Arabiya wa-l-Dafa’a ’Anha,” 26 September, Issue 1026, 12 September 2002. 
 
21 Muhammad Ali Saleh, “Hudur Mutaqaddim li-l-Yaman fi al-Intisar li-l-Haqq al-’Araby wa-l-Juhud al- 
Dawli li-Mukafihat al-Irhab,” 26 September, Issue 1024, 29 August 2002. 
 
22 Alaskandar Asbahi, “Wamdat: Tahaluf al-Irhab,” 26 September, Issue 1036, 17 October 2002. 
 
23 Author Unknown, “Ra’is al-Jihaz al-Markazi l-l-Amn al-Siyasi li-’26 Sabtambir’: 40 ’Aman wa haj al- 
Thawra...Intilaqa wa Tahawwul Nahwa Mustaqbil Akthar Rakha’an,” 26 September, Issue 1027, 19 Septem- 
ber 2002. 
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it. Thus, although they did not explicitly call for additional counterterrorism assistance, 
articles during this period did not hesitate to appear loyal and even subservient to US inter- 
ests. President Saleh perhaps most eloquently  reflected this in a November  2002 speech, 
during which he opined: 
 
It is of the utmost importance that all regional and international efforts com- 
bine to address terrorism  in all its forms and shapes..this is not the responsi- 
bility of one country on its own, or one international clique on its own, but it 
is the responsibility of everybody. Terrorism is a global phenomenon that is 
not limited by geographic, ethnic, or religious  features, and undermines the 
entire world with its evil24 
 
Saleh’s ability to signal compliance with US counterterrorism objectives would not 
always be so unconstrained.  That is, as the Yemeni opposition grew more contentious and 
geographically diverse, and, consequently, the threat of US punishment less-pronounced, 
the Yemeni government would need to attenuate the extent to which it would discuss this 
“global phenomenon.” I turn to a case where this occurred next. 
 
1.5.3  Fuel Riots and Regime Concern (April-July 2005) 
From May-July  2005 the Saleh regime endured a much more contentious opposition 
than it did in 2002. Although its domestic security apparatus remained in-tact, the Yemeni 
government faced the enormous task of having to cut fuel subsidies, an act that would have 
deleterious effects on the vast majority of the poverty-stricken  country. As the Yemeni 
Parliament debated this issue, however, inklings of popular discontent began to emerge. 
Indeed, months prior to the vote, a number of Yemeni cities, to include Taiz, the capital 
city Sana’a, and others witnessed demonstrations  and strikes in protest of the potential 
price hike. Despite this, the Yemeni parliament voted in July 2005 to cut these subsidies, 
sending the price of fuel sky-rocketing. Almost immediately, Yemenis took to the streets in 
protest, in what would  evolve into continuous  riots across the country for nearly a week.  As 
clashes between protesters and military forces intensified and owners of fuel stations went 
on a countrywide  strike, President Saleh made concessions to the protesters, to include  a 
 
 
24 “Khattab  Fakhamat al-Ra’is bi-Munasaba Shahr Ramadan Karim,” 5 November 2002. 
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smaller reduction in fuel subsidies, increased wages for civil servants, and lowering  the 
sales tax. Months after this unrest, on 17 December 2005, Saleh pledged to never again 
run for President, a pledge on which he would renege. 
Given that President Saleh was already under enormous pressure during this period, 
the US would be limited in its ability to punish him. Indeed, the country was at a high risk 
of disintegration, and thus donor sanctions would very likely lead to state failure (Phillips 
2006). Indeed, as opposition  to Saleh mounted during this period, US diplomats were 
careful in being too critical of the Saleh regime’s counterterrorism  cooperation, arguing, 
for example, that “the fight against terrorism is important....but that doesn’t give any [gov- 
ernment] the right to abuse its citizens.”25  Such rhetoric would serve as a signal  to the 
Saleh regime that the US was encouraging reform, but would not seek its ouster or punish 
it for not making gains against terrorist groups. 
Because the Saleh regime would naturally  want to avoid encouraging this renewed do- 
mestic opposition  movement by using public means to attract counterterrorism aid, articles 
in 26 September reflected a much less alarmed tone with respect to the threat of al-Qaeda 
than they had in 2002. For example, an article reporting on a symposium held in the Hajja 
governorate proclaimed, “One can look at [the manner of] Yemen’s dealing with terror- 
ism, describing it as a paragon  of the wise political approach that depends on dialogue as 
a way to eradicate the thorn of terrorism...without  forgetting the importance of the mili- 
tary solution from time to time.”26  Another piece that was demonstrative of this trend in 
discourse was written in June, in which the author decried the conflation of terrorism and 
Islam, while arguing that terrorism  was a result of a “lack of political and economic jus- 
tice.”27 When writers in the newspaper did acknowledge the danger of terrorism, they only 
did so from the perspective that it would invite further attacks from the West on Muslim 
lands. In the wake of the July 2005 al-Qaeda attacks in the United Kingdom, for example, 
 
 
25 Christian Chaise, “US Charges over Human Rights Upset Yemen,” Agence France Press, 16 March, 
2005 
 
26 Author Unknown, “Fi Nadwa Nadhamatha 26 Sabtabir Wakilat al-Tarbiya wa al-Majlis al-Mahali bi- 
Muhafaza Hajja,” 26 September, Issue 1201, 26 May 2005. 
 
27 Author Unknown, “Kalimat 26 Sebtambir: Mu’tamir al-Intilaqa!,” 26 September, Issue 1206, 30 June 
2005. 
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a writer argued, “The only thing that things like this savagery achieve is an increase in ag- 
gression against Arabs, Muslims, and Islam as a faith.”28 Given this aversion from directly 
discussing terrorism  as a pressing threat to the Yemeni Republic or Yemen’s  role as a US 
security partner, it should come as no surprise that the violence that occurred in July was 
described almost exclusively as “sabotage.”29 
These trends were also reflected in President Saleh’s speeches.  Indeed, rather than 
depicting  terrorism  as a grave threat to the world and Yemeni Republic,  the President 
juxtaposed terrorism with generic references to stability and criminal activity, while si- 
multaneously emphasizing the Yemeni security force’s successes in this area: 
 
We greatly appreciate all of the tangible  efforts  and successes that our security 
apparatus has achieved in executing the plan to spread security, maintain sta- 
bility and security, fighting  terrorism and organized crime,and arresting mis- 
chief makers and scoff-laws...30 
 
In this section I have explored how the Saleh regime adjusted its discourse with respect 
to terrorism as opposition  to its policies became more pressing and thus, donor punishment 
less likely. Instead of emphasizing the threat of al-Qaeda as it had when opposition activity 
was low, in this case the regime avoided the term or downplayed the threat it posed to the 
Yemeni Republic, lest it appear overly reliant on US support. In discussing the Yemen 
Republic’s successes against terrorist  groups,  the Saleh regime attributed  its success to 
its own domestic strategies and resources, rather than international  support.  In the next 
section, however, we will see how an extremely high level of opposition activity will 
drive the Saleh government to relentlessly invoke terrorist discourse to attract international 
support. 
 
 
28 Yahya Abd al-Raqib al-Jabihi, “al-T’aid allati ta’d Sahibha,” 26 September, Issue 1208, 14 July 2005. 
 
29 See, for example: Muhammad ’Abd al-Aziz, “Al-Muwajihat..Muhadadatha wa Dururatha,” 26 Septem- 
ber, Issue 1211, 28 July 2005. 
 
30 “Khattab Fakhamat al-Ra’is fi al-’Aid al-Khamis ’Ashr li-l-Wahda al-Yamaniya.” 21 May 2005. 
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1.5.4 On the Verge of Collapse (June-October 2011) 
As the Arab Spring protests gathered steam across the Middle East and North Africa, 
students organized  a sit in at Sana’a University, calling for a peaceful democratic  transi- 
tion from Saleh family rule. Soon thereafter, large-scale demonstrations  erupted across the 
country, from the Southern governorate of Aden to the Northwestern Sa’ada governorate. 
At the same time, the militant Southern Secessionist Movement,  as well as al-Qa’ida in the 
Arabian Peninsula, continued their armed campaign against government forces. By May, 
general strikes were called in a number of the country’s major cities, including Aden and 
Ta’iz, and the opposition showed little sign of relenting. Throughout this period, however, 
President Saleh refused to make major concessions to the protesters. After initially pledg- 
ing to not run for the office of the Presidency again, a promise he had made and reneged 
on years earlier, he resisted local and international  efforts to foster a democratic transition. 
It was amidst this high level of opposition activity that Saleh’s delicate coalition began 
to unfurl. First came the 21 March defection of general Ali Muhsin  al-Ahmar,  a fellow 
Sanhani tribesmen and commander of Yemen’s 1st Armored Division, who decried the 
Saleh regime’s  “policy of annihilation  and marginalization”  and deployed his forces to 
protect protesters who had gathered in the capital.31 This key military defection led to 
the defection of additional military commanders, including  but not limited to Hamid al- 
Qashibi, the commander of the regime’s military forces in the capital.32 The head of the 
Hashid tribal confederation, Sadiq al-Ahmar,  though having resigned from the govern- 
ment in February, similarly abandoned his role as mediator  between the protesters and the 
government, siding with the former. The decision of this tribal shaykh to no longer be neu- 
tral led many tribes to mobilize their constituents in demonstrations and militant activities 
against the Saleh regime. 
The pressure of continued demonstrations, strikes, violent  clashes, and defections all 
came to a pinnacle in May 2011, as the government  began to lose control  of state facilities 
in major cities and witnessed defections within the elite Republican Guard units. On top of 
this, oil production temporarily halted in early May, undoubtedly placing additional strain 
 
 
31 “al-Lahadha al-Hasima allati Hasamat Tarikh Yaman,” Youtube, 21 March 2011 
 
32 “al-Inshiqaq Yasra’ Suqut Saleh,” al-Jazeera, 22 March 2011. 
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on the regime’s coffers. To reassert his authority,  Saleh deployed loyalist  forces led by his 
family members to put down protests, leading to clashes between Hashid tribesmen and 
forces loyal to General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar on the one hand, and the Saleh regime on 
the other. As fighting  increased in intensity in the capital city, on 3 June violence reached 
President Saleh’s compound.  When Saleh attended Friday prayers, he was wounded in 
an explosion, leaving him badly injured. Eventually  seeking medical treatment abroad, 
President Saleh was forced to temporarily relinquish power to then-Vice President Abu 
Mansur Hadi. Although  Saleh would nominally hold onto the reigns of power upon his 
return to Sana’a in September 2011, he formally accepted the Gulf Cooperation Council- 
endorsed transition plan and resigned on February 27, 2012. 
For its part, the US gradually  increased its support for the opposition’s  demands. 
Although initially the Obama administration  expressed vague concerns over violence  in 
the country  and argued that Saleh was “the best partner we [the US Government] will 
have...,”33  the US eventually helped negotiate his exit from power. That is, Saleh reached 
the point where the opposition  posed such a threat to his regime that his US donors could 
no longer support him staying in power. 
Both the intensity of opposition and fear of US abandonment would lead Saleh to con- 
sistently signal compliance with US counterterrorism priorities and demand additional 
assistance.   This sense of urgency with respect to terrorism is clearly reflected in the 
pages of 26 September. Although  the newspaper’s articles covered its campaign against 
AQAP-backed  Ansar al-Sharia insurgents,34  others would seek to emphasize the threat of 
al-Qaeda by linking it with the Yemeni political opposition. In one article, the author tied 
the Islamist Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah) with its more violent ilk, claiming, 
“al-Qaeda emerged from the same cloth as the Muslim Brotherhood (the Yemeni Congre- 
gation for Reform), the primary member of the [Joint] Meeting [Parties]...it[al-Qaeda] is 
 
 
33 Laura Kasinof  and Scott Shane, “Radical  Cleric  Demands Ouster of Yemen Leader, New York Times, 1 
March 2011. 
 
34 See, for example: Ahmad al-Habishi, “Abtal al-Quwat al-Maslaha wa-l-Aman...Yuwajihun  bi-basala 
Fulul al-Irhabiyin min Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi Zanjibar,” 26 September, 23 June 2011. 
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the criminal tool [the Joint Meeting  Parties] use to implement their hellish plans.”35  An 
article later in June echoed this sentiment, describing the danger both al-Qa’ida  and the 
Joint Meeting Parties posed to the “unity of the state,” going on to cite Western analysts 
description of Yemen  as an al-Qaeda “safe haven” (miladh amin).36 In another  case, a 
writer more subtly described the al-Qaeda threat as “al-Qaida,  it’s armed men, and those 
political  leaders who support them.”37 
Beyond the pages of the military’s newspaper, President Saleh too went to great lengths 
to emphasize the threat of al-Qaeda in his speeches, while simultaneously expressing sup- 
port for the United States. On 14 May, for example, the President echoed the sentiment 
that would later be reflected in the pages of 26 September, noting, ”Unfortunately, ele- 
ments of al-Qaeda are supported from some of the [political] parties, specifically the Mus- 
lim Brotherhood (al-Islah)....these elements [of al-Qaeda] that exploit the circumstances 
of crisis....in the protests side by side with the rebellious Huthist elements and Joint Meet- 
ing Parties...”38  As fighting raged in Sana’a, President Saleh further  addressed the Yemeni 
opposition directly in a speech: 
 
Those seeking power who simply talk with the public as if the regime left, 
al-Qaeda would end: Yes, al-Qaeda would end because it would complete 
its control over Mareb, Hadr Mawt, Shabwa, Abyan, and Jawf...As for those 
[seeking power], they will not have control because they are not accepted. 
The sons of these governorates would  be forced to accept al-Qaeda, and that 
is what we hope our friends in the United States and the European Union 
realize....it would be worse than it is now39 
 
35 “Masdar bi-Dakhiliya: Bilagh al-Mushtarak Hawwul Taslim Madinat Zanjibar li-l-’Anasir al-Irhabiya 
Taghtiya ’ala Mukhatatatha al-Takhribiya,” 26 September, 1 June 2011. 
 
36 Ahmad al-Habishi, “Lahdhat Huryia: Waqfa Sari’a Imam Murahanat Tadwil al-Azma al-Siyasiya,” 26 
September, 16 June 2011. 
 
37 Muhammad Hashim Munib, “7 Yuliyu...Yawm Intisar Iradat al-Dimuqratiya,” 26 September, 6 July 
2011. 
 
38 ”Nus Muqabalat Fakhamat al-Ra’is ma’ Sahifat ’Ukaz al-Sa’udiya,” 14 May 2011. 
 
39 “Kalimat Fakhamat al-Ra’is bi-Munasabat al-’Aid al-Watani al-21 li-I’adat Tahqiq al-Wahda,” 21 May 
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Just months before he would leave office, President Saleh returned to Yemen after re- 
covering from the assassination attempt. As the President delivered what would be his 
last speech as President commemorating the overthrow of the Imamate regime on Septem- 
ber 26, 1962, the date for which his military’s newspaper was named, he went to greater 
lengths to highlight his relationship with the United States: “Thank you to our friends in 
the United  States of America for their cooperation with us against the terrorist  elements 
(the al-Qaeda Organization)...”40 
Just as he had in May of the same year and, nearly a decade earlier,  the President thus 
clearly sought to publicize the threat of al-Qaeda violence and highlight  his cooperation 
with the West. 
In this section I have shown how the convergence of demonstrations, strikes, defec- 
tions, and potential US abandonment led the Saleh regime to attempt to link al-Qa‘ida with 
other domestic opposition groups, emphasize the immediacy of the al-Qa‘ida  threat, and 
highlight his cooperative relationship with Western donors. All of this would, of course, 
signal to opposition  groups that he had lost control, but would also signal to his donors 
that he was willing to comply with their demands. 
 
1.6 Conclusion: Recipients and their Domestic Calculations 
In this paper I have argued that recipients of counterterrorism assistance will be more 
likely to attract military aid through public diplomacy when they perceive opposition ac- 
tivity to be extremely low, or extremely high. Through an in-depth examination of Yemen, 
I have offered limited statistical and qualitative support for my hypotheses of a curvilinear 
relationship  between a regime’s willingness to emphasize the threat of terrorism to attract 
counterterrorism  support and the perceived threat of opposition groups. In this section I 
begin with a brief summary of my argument, before turning to a discussion of the implica- 
tions and future questions these findings  raise for work on military aid and its recipients. 
 
 
2011 
 
40 “Nus Kalimat Fakhamat al-Ra’is bi-Munasabat al-’Aid al-49 li-Thawrat al-26 min September,”  25 
September 2011. 
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Existing literature on military assistance largely  assumes that foreign  aid is uncondi- 
tionally helpful for recipients. With respect to counterterrorism aid, donors provide mili- 
tary assistance to induce the recipient’s cooperation in, and enhance their capacity to, fight 
terrorist groups. In turn, recipients can resist international  democratization pressure and 
more effectively repress their domestic opposition.  By making these arguments, however, 
existing literature fails to recognize the problems accepting this assistance can pose for 
recipients domestically.  For one, because it involves  accepting  a policy objective from 
the donor, receiving foreign aid makes a recipient appear unresponsive to his constituents 
and elite coalitions. Further, attracting or demanding counterterrorism aid can be costly in 
that it makes the incumbent appear unable to assert its authority.  Recipients can also face 
potential punishment should they refuse to comply with donor objectives. 
These dilemmas should be reflected in the recipient’s willingness to use public diplo- 
macy to attract counterterrorism aid. If we only considered the donor recipient relationship 
as a principal-agent  dynamic,  we would expect the incumbent to relentlessly  use public 
diplomacy to please its principal. Yet, incumbents will be constrained in their ability to 
do so by opposition activity. When the recipient perceives this threat to be very high or 
very low, it will emphasize the threat of terrorism in its public discourse. In the case of the 
former, it is on the verge of collapse and willing to shoulder the costs of emboldening op- 
position. Here the incumbent is trying to avoid abandonment from its donors. In the latter 
it need not be concerned with strengthening an extremely weak opposition, and, because it 
is entrenched, faces the possibility of being punished by the donor for non-compliance. It 
is when the regime perceives a moderate threat from domestic opposition that it will avoid 
attracting counterterrorism aid through public diplomacy. 
Through  a mixed-methods  research design, I have offered limited support for these 
hypotheses. My large n analysis provides support to the hypothesis that at medium levels 
of opposition activity a recipient  will be less likely to use counterterrorism  public diplo- 
macy, and at high levels of opposition activity it will be more willing to do so. I have 
found less support for the hypothesis that the incumbent will employ counterterrorism 
diplomacy consistently when opposition activity is low. My qualitative analysis of spe- 
cific time periods of Saleh’s post-9/11 tenure adds more support to my theory,  as we are 
able to clearly  see how changes in the activity of opposition groups led to shifts in official 
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discourse regarding the immediacy  and urgency of terrorism, and the willingness  of the 
Yemeni government to highlight its security partnership with the United States. 
The limited support I find for my hypothesis speaks to what could be a broader gap 
in the burgeoning literature examining transnational donor-recipient relationships and for- 
eign aid. By viewing these relationships  through the lens of principal-agent dynamics, this 
literature has overwhelmingly focused on the perspective of the former. It has not yet con- 
sidered that domestic contexts within the recipient state can have a mediating influence on 
foreign aid. Moving beyond regime type, this means an understanding of how bargaining 
between donors, recipients, opposition  groups, and elite coalitions in turn effect aid re- 
cipient’s activities. I have taken a first step in addressing this, but future work could more 
closely trace how shifts in ruling coalitions and domestic opposition interact in this regard. 
This requires abandoning the assumption that the recipient is a unitary  actor. 
This all points to the need for additional attention to the mediating effects that internal 
dynamics, characteristics, and calculations of recipients  can have on international  assis- 
tance. This would help scholars better understand when and where the perverse effects of 
military aid might be more pronounced. We might consider how varying levels of oppo- 
sition activity within recipient  states influences bargaining between donors, incumbents, 
and recipient security institutions. 
In this paper I have argued, and found some support for, the theory that military as- 
sistance can pose dilemmas on the domestic front for recipients, and that these dilemmas 
are reflected in their willingness to use public diplomacy  to attract it. Through  the case of 
Yemen we observed how the Yemeni military and President Saleh adjusted their rhetoric 
based on shifts in domestic circumstances. With these findings  in mind, additional inquiry 
into how domestic calculations, recipient characteristics, and international aid interact to 
drive recipient behavior and the overall effects of this aid may be warranted. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A SEARCH AND CODING PRODECURES, OPPOSITION ACTIVITY EVENT 
DATA 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The goal of this collection effort is to locate and code data on publicly observable 
dimensions of political activism in Yemen, to include everything from demonstrations and 
strikes to riots and organized violence. We will do this by collecting  a series of variables 
on specific events of political  activism (a demonstration, a riot, or a strike, for example). 
Each event is to be coded according to twenty one variables, which are intended to cap- 
ture five main dimensions of political activism in Yemen. The first relates to the LEVEL 
OF ORGANIZATION of the opposition activists involved in the event. That is, was this 
event carried out by a group with a clearly identifiable  leadership structure such as a po- 
litical party? Or, alternatively,  was this an instance of spontaneous rioting or protest by a 
more unorganized political entity? 
Second, events will be coded according to the DEMANDS made during the event. 
Were the activists calling for narrowly-defined concessions from the regime?  Were they 
protesting a specific policy of the regime? Or, conversely, were they demanding for regime 
change? 
Third, if available, the RESPONSE of the regime to the protests is of importance  as 
well. Did the regime respond to the event with concessions, repression, or a mix of both? 
Did the regime have to deploy internal security forces? 
The TACTICS  employed by activists during the event will also be coded. Was this a 
case of terrorist violence against the state? Or, was it a primarily peaceful demonstration 
or march? 
Finally, the MAGNITUDE of the event is the final variable that will be coded for each 
event. Did this event include thousands of protesters? Or, was it a small group of protesters 
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involved? 
Because this project focuses on the Saleh regime in the post 9/11 period, the timeframe 
of interest is September 2001 1 March 2012. 
 
A.1 Search Procedure 
Open the LexixNexis  Academic and use the advanced search interface 
In the Add Index Terms Section, select Geography, then click the plus sign next to 
Middle East. Check the box next to Yemen. 
In the Select Source section click Browse Sources -¿ News. At the top of this screen 
click Newswires  and Press Releases. Select the following thirteen sources, and then click 
the red Ok -continue button: 
 
• Agence France Presse - English - Middle East and Africa Stories 
 
• ARABIA 2000 
 
• Associated Press Online 
 
• Associated Press Publications 
 
• Associated Press Worldstream 
 
• The Associated Press 
 
• The Associated Press - Middle East and Africa Stories 
 
• Emirates News Agency (Arabic) 
 
• Inter Press Service - Middle East and Africa Stories 
 
• News Bites - Middle East and North Africa 
 
• States News Service  Middle East and North Africa 
 
• Wire Service Stories 
 
• Xinhua General News Service - Middle East and Africa Stories 
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A.2   Code Definitions 
ID Column: Lists the unique event number (NOTE: I will write these in) 
Start Date: the day, month and year for when the event begins, in DD/MM/YYYY format. 
If it is difficult to ascertain the exact day a protest began, you can approximate  it based 
on available information. The start year (stryear), start month (strmonth),  and start day 
(strday) are in separate columns. 
End Date:the day, month and year for when the event ends, in DD/MM/YYYY  format. 
If it is difficult to ascertain the exact day a protest ended, you can approximate  based on 
available information.  The end year (endyear), endmonth (strmonth), and endday (strday) 
are in separate columns. 
Duration: Total number of days the event lasted 
Etype: The type of event based on the current coding scheme 
 
• 1= Organized Demonstration: Distinct, continuous largely peaceful, action directed 
toward government authorities. Clear leadership or organizations can be identified 
 
• 2= Spontaneous Demonstration:   Distinct, continuous largely peaceful, action di- 
rected toward government authorities.  Clear leadership or organizations cannot be 
identified 
 
• 3= Organized Violent Riot: Distinct, continuous largely violent, action directed to- 
ward government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical  injury or 
property damage. Clear leadership or organizations can be identified 
 
• 4= Spontaneous Violent Riot: Distinct, continuous, and violent action directed to- 
ward government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical  injury or 
property damage. Clear leadership or organizations cannot be identified 
 
• 5= General Strike: Members of an organization or union abandon workplaces 
 
• 6= Limited Strike: Members of an organization  or union abandon work places in 
limited  sectors or industries 
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• 7= Anti-Government Violence: Distinct violent event waged by a non-state  group 
against government authorities or symbols of this authority. In this case the actor 
has a permanent militant  wing. 
 
• 8= Intra-government violence: Violent event between two armed factions associated 
with different elements of the government. 
 
Escalation: Did the event change or evolve during its duration? 
 
• 1= Organized Demonstration: Distinct, continuous largely peaceful, action directed 
toward government authorities. Clear leadership or organizations can be identified 
 
• 2= Spontaneous Demonstration:   Distinct, continuous largely peaceful, action di- 
rected toward government authorities.  Clear leadership or organizations cannot be 
identified 
 
• 3= Organized Violent Riot: Distinct, continuous largely violent, action directed to- 
ward government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical  injury or 
property damage. Clear leadership or organizations can be identified 
 
• 4= Spontaneous Violent Riot: Distinct, continuous, and violent action directed to- 
ward government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical  injury or 
property damage. Clear leadership or organizations cannot be identified 
 
• 5= General Strike: Members of an organization or union abandon workplaces 
 
• 6= Limited Strike: Members of an organization  or union abandon work places in 
limited  sectors or industries 
 
• 7= Anti-Government Violence: Distinct violent event waged by a non-state  group 
against government authorities or symbols of this authority. In this case the actor 
has a permanent militant  wing of organization 
 
• 8= Intra-government violence: Violent event between two armed factions associated 
with different elements of the government. 
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• 9= Anti-Foreigner Violence: Violent event or kidnapping where foreign citizens are 
the primary target 
 
 
A.3 Actor 
Actor Huthi: Coded 1 if the event involved  actors associated with the Huthi rebellion 
Actor-Southern: Coded 1 if the event involved  actors associated with the Southern move- 
ment 
Actor JMP: Coded 1 if the event involved  actors associated working under the banner of 
the Joint Meeting Parties 
Actor- Islah: Coded 1 if the event involved  actors associated with the Islah party 
Actor Polparty:  Coded 1 if the event involved  actors associated with another political 
party not mentioned in 9 or 10. 
Actor- Tribe: Coded 1 if the event involved actors who clearly identify with, and act on 
behalf of, a specific tribe 
 
 
A.4 Target 
Centgovtarget:Coded 1 if the activist demands and/or activities specifically targeted 
facilities, policies, or personnel directly  associated with the central government in Sanaa. 
Rgovtarget: Coded 1 if the activist demands and/or activities specifically  targeted regional 
or provincial governmental facilities, policies, or personnel. 
Issue 1: What was the first issue mentioned  as the source of the tension/disorder? 
 
• 1= elections 
 
• 2= Jobs, economy (tax policy,  etc.) 
 
• 3= food, water, subsistence 
 
• 4= environmental degredation 
 
• 5= Tribal, religious, or ethnic discrimination 
 
• 6= education 
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• 7= foreign relations/wars 
 
• 8= domestic war, violence 
 
• 9= human rights 
 
• 10= democracy 
 
• 11= Access to government patronage 
 
• 12= other (write in) 
 
Issue 2:What  was the second issue, if any, that was mentioned  as the source of the 
tension/disorder? 
 
• 1= elections 
 
• 2= Jobs, economy (tax policy,  etc.) 
 
• 3= food, water, subsistence 
 
• 4= environmental degredation 
 
• 5= Tribal, religious, or ethnic discrimination 
 
• 6= education 
 
• 7= foreign relations/wars 
 
• 8= domestic war, violence 
 
• 9= human rights 
 
• 10= democracy 
 
• 11= Access to government patronage 
 
• 12= other (write in) 
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Issue 3: What was the third issue, if any, that was mentioned  as the source of the 
tension/disorder? 
 
• 1= elections 
 
• 2= Jobs, economy (tax policy,  etc.) 
 
• 3= food, water, subsistence 
 
• 4= environmental degredation 
 
• 5= Tribal, religious, or ethnic discrimination 
 
• 6= education 
 
• 7= foreign relations/wars 
 
• 8= domestic war, violence 
 
• 9= human rights 
 
• 10= democracy 
 
• 11= Access to government patronage 
 
• 12= other (write in) 
 
 
IssueCTCoop: Coded 1 if the issue was related to the Yemeni governments post 9/11 
security cooperation with the United States. 
Npart: Approximate number of participants in the event 
 
• 1= Less than 10 
 
• 2= 10-100 
 
• 3= 101-1,000 
 
• 4= 1,001-10,000 
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• 5= 10,0001 to 100,000 
 
• 6= 100,001-1,000,000 
 
• 7= over 1,000,0000 
 
• -99= unknown 
 
Ndeathgov: Approximate number of government-affiliated  actors killed in the event 
 
• 1= Less than 10 
 
• 2= 10-100 
 
• 3= 101-1,000 
 
• 4= 1,001-10,000 
 
• 5= 10,0001 to 100,000 
 
• 6= 100,001-1,000,000 
 
• 7= over 1,000,0000 
 
• -99= unknown 
 
Ndeathopp: Approximate number of opposition-affiliated  actors killed in the event 
 
• 1= Less than 10 
 
• 2= 10-100 
 
• 3= 101-1,000 
 
• 4= 1,001-10,000 
 
• 5= 10,0001 to 100,000 
 
• 6= 100,001-1,000,000 
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• 7= over 1,000,0000 
 
• -99= unknown 
 
Repress:Coded 1 if the government responded to the event with repression of opposi- 
tion groups or activists 
Deploy-riot:Coded 1 if the government response included the deployment  of riot police 
Deploy-para: Coded 1 if the government response included  the deployment  of paramili- 
tary internal security forces 
Deploy-mil:  Coded 1 if the government response included the deployment of national- 
level military assets 
Concession: Coded 1 if the government responded to the event by offering  concessions to 
opposition actors 
Eloc-town: Identifies the name of the town or city in which the event occurred (leave 
blank if unavailable) 
Eloc-disctrict: Identifies the name of the district in which the event occurred (leave blank 
if unavailable) 
Eloc-Province:  Identifies  the name of the Province/governorate  in which the event oc- 
curred (leave blank if unavailable) 
Notes: Any additional notes you would like to provide that might be of relevance
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